Cities as networks within networks of cities: the evolution of the city/firm-duality in the world city network, 2000-2010 by Xingjian Liu (537460) et al.
1Cities as networks within networks of cities: the evolution of the
city/firm-duality in the world city network, 2000-20101
Xingjian Liu1, Ben Derudder2, Frank Witlox2, Michael Hoyler3
1. Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, University of North Carolina at Charlotte,
USA. Email: xliu36@uncc.edu
2. Geography Department, Ghent University, Belgium. Email: ben.derudder@ugent.be;
frank.witlox@ugent.be
3. Department of Geography, Loughborough University, UK. Email: M.Hoyler@lboro.ac.uk
Abstract
We explore the temporal evolution of cities and firms (i.e. both modes) in a two-mode
intercity corporate network formed by 50 leading advanced producer service firms across
154 cities for the years 2000 and 2010. Drawing upon one-mode network projection and
three network centralities, we assess the shifting positions of individual cities and firms in
the one-mode intercity and interfirm networks. Major findings include: (1) the intercity
network is more stable and hierarchical than the interfirm network; (2) brokerage functions,
as captured by betweenness centrality, remain highly uneven for both cities and firms. For
example, New York and London’s distinct positions as the world’s leading producer service
centres remain intact; and (3) regional and sectoral tendencies are evident in terms of
growth rates of centralities.
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1 Our title is appropriately based on Berry’s (1964) classic paper, in which he emphasised that the
study of cities’ position in a ‘system’ cannot be separated from the study of what goes in within
these cities. The analytical approach advanced in this paper reflects the spirit of Berry’s message.
2INTRODUCTION
It seems fair to state that Peter Taylor’s (2001) formal specification of the ‘world city
network’ (WCN) as an ‘interlocking network’ has been a milestone in the world cities
literature. In this ‘interlocking world city network model’ (IWCNM), cities are deemed
connected through the flows of information, knowledge, capital, people, etc. generated
within the office networks of globalised advanced producer services (APS) firms. Drawing on
this IWCNM specification and a series of concomitant data gatherings to ‘feed’ the model,
Taylor and colleagues from the Globalisation and World Cities (GaWC) research network
have provided detailed descriptions of the connectivity of cities in the WCN (e.g. Taylor et
al. 2011).
Parallel to the APS analyses of the GaWC group (www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc), other approaches
and strategies have been developed to study WCN formation. This includes studies of global
infrastructure networks such as airline passenger networks (e.g. Smith & Timberlake 2001),
maritime networks (e.g. Ducruet 2013), and Internet backbone networks (e.g. Rutherford et
al. 2004), but also strategies that are more akin to the GaWC approach in that the analytical
focus is on the geographies of corporate networks (e.g. Hoyler & Watson 2013; Krätke 2014;
for overviews, see Liu & Derudder, 2012a; Neal, 2013). The most common approach in this
regard has been empirical research that focuses on headquarter-subsidiary relations within
the corporate structures of multinational corporations (MNCs), for example, the work of
Alderson & Beckfield (2004), Wall & van der Knaap (2011), and Rozenblat & Pumain (2007).
The particular appeal of the research drawing on Taylor’s IWCNM can probably be traced
back to its theoretical foundations. In a literature that had long been flawed by a
combination of eclecticism and fuzziness, Taylor (2001) presented the IWCNM in the
context of the well-established literature on social network analysis. In addition, the
assumptions underlying the IWCNM specification were not merely asserted, but explained
in the context of Sassen’s (1991) research on ‘global cities’ and Castells’ (2001) writings on
‘the rise of the network society’. Nonetheless, some of the tenets of the IWCNM
specification have – albeit somewhat belatedly – come under close scrutiny in recent years
3(e.g. Nordlund 2004; Beckfield & Alderson 2006; Neal 2011, 2012, 2013; Hennemann &
Derudder 2013). One issue that has been raised in this context, and which will also be the
core focus of this paper, is that most of the research drawing on the IWCNM does not make
appropriate use of all the information contained in the original datasets.
Taylor’s (2001) specification of the WCN essentially starts off as a so-called ‘two-mode
network’ or ‘dual network’ (Breiger 1974; Liu & Derudder 2012b). A two-mode network
consists of two disjointed sets of nodes, whereby the primary data connect nodes of both
sets. The starting point of GaWC’s analyses are indeed two-mode networks, as the datasets
consist of two disjointed sets of nodes (world cities and globalised APS firms) whereby the
primary data consist of links connecting nodes of the different sets (the presence of
globalised APS firms in world cities). In principle, two one-mode networks can be projected
from GaWC’s two-mode datasets (Neal 2008), that is, a city-by-city adjacency matrix (such
as the IWCNM as it is commonly studied) and a firm-by-firm adjacency matrix (a dataset
detailing the co-location of firms in cities). As a corollary, the IWCNM essentially tells only
‘half’ of the story, that of the cities. Although this may seem warranted or even logical given
that the research focuses on city network formation, network analysts have lamented such
a one-sided approach to two-mode networks by pointing to the information loss this
engenders (e.g. Breiger 1974; Latapy et al. 2008).
A two-mode perspective on WCN-formation not only recognises that (1) inter-city networks
emerge from the daily exchanges amongst branches of a globalised APS firm in different
cities, but also that (2) inter-firm networks emerge from, say, information sharing,
cooperation, and innovation diffusion among different APS firms in a given city (e.g. Bathelt
et al. 2004). Despite its appeal and merit, then, the IWCNM does not do full justice to this
‘duality of cities and firms’ (cf. Neal 2008) in the formation of WCNs, as the information on
how APS firms organise themselves in cities is cast-off: information on which firms co-locate
in what cities may be crucial to our understanding of WCN formation, but is being discarded.
The purpose of this paper is to complement the research drawing on the IWCNM by
presenting a two-mode analysis of the world city/APS firm-nexus as measured in the GaWC
data. Neal (2008) has presented such an analysis based on GaWC data for the year 2000.
4Here we extend his work by adding a longitudinal element to the analysis, exploring changes
in both modes of WCN-formation as measured for 2000 and 2010.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we spell out in more
detail the differences between a one-mode and a two-mode analysis of the WCN. We then
describe our datasets containing information on the presence of 50 globalised APS firms in
154 world cities for the years 2000 and 2010. The ensuing section presents our
measurement framework, which entails a description of different centrality measures to
analyse the position of nodes in networks. This is followed by a discussion of our results,
after which our paper is concluded with a summary of our main findings and suggestions for
further research.
THE IWCNM: A TWO-MODE NETWORK
As noted, Taylor’s (2001) specification of the WCN essentially starts off as a so-called ‘two-
mode network’, which is characterised by connections between two separate sets of nodes
(cities and firms). By contrast, in more conventional one-mode networks, actors are directly
interlinked (e.g. cities connected by airline flows). The gist of two-mode networks is that
there is no direct linkage within the same set of nodes (i.e. between cities or between
firms): researchers simply know which firms are in what cities, and which cities house what
firms. Such city-by-firm datasets have been collected as intermediate products in WCN
studies that approximate urban networks through an analysis of the organisational
structures of multinational enterprises (e.g., Alderson & Beckfield 2006; Hoyler et al. 2008;
Wall 2009; Jacobs et al. 2011).
To facilitate our discussion of the implications for the analysis of such data, in what follows
we will make use of a sample city-by-firm matrix (Figure 1), excerpted from the GaWC 2000
dataset. This valued matrix describes a two-mode network consisting of five firms (Ernst and
Young, HSBC, Jones Day, Boston Consulting, BBDO Worldwide) across five cities (New York,
London, Paris, Tokyo and Beijing). The values in the matrix feature the ‘linkage’ between
5cities and firms: The matrix values range from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates absence of a firm, 5
indicates the presence of the firm’s headquarters, and the values in-between are a measure
of the relative importance of an office in a firm’s network. For example, BBDO Worldwide is
headquartered in New York, and has a major office (representing a value of 4) in London
and a middle-of-the-road office (representing a value of 2) in Beijing.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
To date, most empirical analyses of two-mode networks in general and intercity corporate
networks in particular have followed one of two major directions: (1) a direct two-mode
examination of the data; or (2) its conversion into a one-mode network.
The direct two-mode network approach allows for a direct examination of the duality, using
all the information contained within the city-by-firm data matrix, namely, cities and firms
are studied simultaneously. In its simplest form, the two-mode approach treats the city-by-
firm network as a multivariate dataset and applies different multivariate statistical methods
to reveal patterns in the data (e.g. Taylor 2004; Taylor & Derudder 2004; Taylor et al.
2013a). However, such a straightforward multivariate analysis implicitly falls short of
accounting for the interdependence among individual firms’ locational strategies, that is,
the assumptions of many statistical models require data points to be independent. More
advanced two-mode network analyses address this interdependence issue and move on to
understanding the underlying dynamics of intercity corporate networks (Liu et al. 2013a).
However, the interpretation of results of two-mode network analysis is not very intuitive,
and may therefore be less attractive for urban scholars. For example, the definitions of
betweenness and closeness centralities of two-mode networks (Borgatti & Everett 1997)
involve both embodied (e.g. firms’ presence in cities) and intangible flows (e.g. technological
spillovers between firms), making it difficult to interpret the importance of individual cities
and firms in a single framework.
A more straightforward and common way to analyse the two-mode city-by-firm network is
to derive city-to-city and firm-to-firm one-mode networks through network projections.
6While the direct two-mode approach analyses cities and firms simultaneously, the one-
mode projection allows us to deal with both modes separately. On the one hand,
connections in the projected city-to-city network are forged by the location of offices of an
APS firm in different cities, and represent potential intercity connections (Taylor 2001). On
the other hand, two firms are deemed as connected in the firm-to-firm network if they co-
locate in the same cities, and the extent of co-location suggests the potential for inter-firm
information exchange (Neal 2008). Bathelt et al. (2004) claim that the knowledge learning
and generation in contemporary knowledge economy are achieved through local
interactions (‘buzz’) as well as knowledge channelled from translocal communications
(‘pipelines’). Therefore, a firm may benefit from co-locating with others (joining local ‘buzz’)
and expanding office networks (making extensive ‘pipelines’), which often lead to co-
locations between firms in multiple cities. Moreover, firms’ locational strategies are often
interrelated (e.g. mimicking and following one another; Liu et al. 2013a).
Both types of one-mode networks are indeed examined in the economic geography and
regional studies literature. For instance, research on urban systems focuses on cities as
interlocked by infrastructure and multi-locational firms (e.g. Mitchelson & Wheeler 1994),
while research on regional clustering focuses on inter-firm networks formed by co-location
of firms in cities or regions (e.g. Polenske 2004; Huber 2011).
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The major drawback of using one-mode projections is that it often inflates the number of
linkages in the network: it tends to generate a very dense city connectivity matrix that is
hard to handle with network analysis techniques (Latapy et al. 2008). For example, the one-
mode intercity and interfirm networks projected from the pedagogic example above
represent two fully connected networks (Figure 2b and 3b). Conventional approaches
adopted to alleviate this issue include applying thresholds and alternative network
projections (Neal 2013, Neal 2014; Hennemann & Derudder, 2013).
7Formally, the projection from the two-mode city-by-firm network into the city-to-city and
firm-to-firm networks can be defined as (Neal 2008)2:
E(c) = V * Vt (1)
E(f) = Vt * V (2)
Where V and Vt represent the original city-by-firm data matrix and its transpose; E(c) is a
one-mode network capturing the intensity of potential intercity connections; E(f) is another
one-mode network measuring the intensity of potential interfirm connections.
A key point is that Taylor’s (2001) interlocking WCN model is essentially a projection from
the original intercity corporate network, namely, equation (1). In the context of our
empirical focus, the assumption behind (1) and (2) is that the more important an office of
firm j in city i, the more links there will be with offices in other cities of firm j’s network as
well as with offices of other firms in city i (i.e. a simple interaction model). For the intercity
network, the limiting case is a city that shares no firms with any other city so that all of its
service value products in equation (1) are 0. Similarly, if a firm does not co-locate with
another firm, it will have no connections in the interfirm network produced by equation (2).
Such projection implies a ‘brute force’ process (Neal 2013) where intercity linkages are a
function of cities’ sizes as represented by the number of firms in individual cities. Similarly,
interfirm connections are in part determined by firms’ absolute sizes as measured by the
number of cities in which individual firms locate.
DATA
To engage in a comprehensive analysis of how positions of firms and cities in the WCN have
changed between 2000 and 2010, we make use of the GaWC datasets for 2000 and 2010 to
2 Similar to gravity/spatial interaction models, the current projection functions assume that links in
the projected city/firm networks are a multiplicative function of city/firm importance. Link weights
can also be produced by additive, strongest-link, or weakest-link functions.
8explore the evolution of both intercity and interfirm networks. The two-mode GaWC data
details the office networks of large professional, financial and creative service firms in cities
throughout the settled world. These data collections are described in detail in Taylor et al.
(2002) for the year 2000 and in Taylor et al. (2013a) for the year 2010, and will be
summarised here as they provide the input to our subsequent analysis. The data collection
involved three major steps:
Selection of cities and firms
In 2000, global APS firms were defined as firms with offices in 15 or more different cities,
including at least one in northern America, western Europe and Pacific Asia. Firms meeting
this criterion were selected from rankings of leading firms in different service sectors. 100
firms were identified in six sectors: 18 in accountancy, 15 in advertising, 23 in
banking/finance, 11 in insurance, 16 in law, and 17 in management consultancy. Selecting
cities was based upon previous GaWC experience in researching global office networks and
also included all capital cities. A total of 315 cities were selected. The end result is a 315
cities by 100 firms matrix.
In 2010, a much larger data collection was performed. A more robust firm selection method
was imposed by including all top firms in individual sectors for which data were available.
The separate banking/finance and insurance sectors in the 2000 dataset were combined,
and the top 75 such firms were selected as ranked in the Forbes composite index, a
measure that combines rankings for sales, profits, assets and market value. For each of the
other four of the previously studied services – accountancy, advertising, law and
management consultancy –the top 25 firms were included based on sectoral rankings
(Derudder et al. 2010). Overall, the number of firms was increased from 100 to 175. In
addition, the number of cities was increased to 526, adding among others many fast-
growing and economically important cities from emerging economies (e.g. China and India).
The end result is a 526 cities by 175 firms matrix.
9Determination of service values
The next step determines values in the city-by-firm matrix. The GaWC approach to assign
‘service values’ focuses on two features of a firm's office(s) in a city as shown on their
corporate websites: first, office size (e.g. number of practitioners), and second, extra-
locational office functions (e.g. regional headquarters). Information for every firm is
simplified into service values ranging from 0 to 5. The city housing a firm's headquarters
scores 5, a city with no office of that firm scores 0. An 'ordinary' or 'typical' office of the firm
scores 2. With something missing (e.g. no partners in a law office), the score is reduced to 1.
Particularly large offices score 3 and those with important extra-territorial functions (e.g.
regional headquarters) score 4. All such assessments are made firm by firm.
Ensuring data consistency
As the sets of cities and firms collected in 2000 and 2010 are not entirely identical, the
challenge is to measure actual structural changes in the WCN rather than changes in the
data gatherings. Here we take the easiest route by restricting our analysis to (1) the 50 firms
that have ‘strong’ linkages (see below) in the projected inter-firm network in 2000 and
2010; and (2) the 154 cities that have ‘strong’ linkages (see below) in the projected intercity
network in 2000 and 20103. As a consequence, the final dataset consists of two 154 cities-
by-154 cities intercity and two 50 firm-by-50 firm inter-firm networks. Although this
restriction causes a loss of data, it provides necessary consistency for a longitudinal analysis.
And finally, we will also look at changes in the connectivity of cities and firms at a higher
level of abstraction, that is, regions (for cities) and sectors (for firms), which may reduce
overall network complexity and highlight major patterns. In order to discern regional
tendencies in the evolution of intercity corporate networks, we adopt the regionalisation
scheme in Taylor et al. (2013a), and assign individual cities into one of the nine major world
regions: Europe (49 cities), North America (26), Latin America (22), Pacific Asia (15), Middle
3 Ensuring cities and firms are ‘connected’ in both years would avoid problems of calculating centrality scores
for isolated nodes and generate more comparable centrality scores. This limits our analysis to cities that are
already ‘connected’ in 2000, focusing less on cities that are isolated in 2000 but merged into the network in
2010.
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East & North Africa (14), South Asia (9), Sub-Saharan Africa (8), Australia (7), and Eurasia (4).
Similarly, firms are labelled with their sectoral affiliations, namely, accountancy (14 firms),
consultancy (11), advertising (10), banking and finance (8), and law (7).
METHODS
For both years, we derive an intercity network and an interfirm network using equations (1)
and (2). We employ the constant thresholding dichotomisation to circumvent the issue of
fully-connected projected networks. An empirical decision is made to consider individual
linkages to be strong enough and set to 1 if they are at least 10 per cent of the strongest
linkage in corresponding networks and 0 otherwise (a sensitivity analysis is provided in the
appendix to justify the use of this 10 per cent threshold; see Butts 2009 for a theoretical
discussion of sensitivity analysis). Although it is clear that this dichotomisation creates issues
such as loss of information (Opsahl & Panzarasa 2009), dichotomised networks allow for a
wide range of network analysis techniques (not limited to the centralities employed in the
current context) as well as backward comparisons with previous studies that use binary
networks (Neal 2008). This leaves us with a 154-by-154 intercity network and a 50-by-50
interfirm network for 2000 and 2010. Our projection and thresholding methods reflect a
theoretical ‘brute force’ perspective on intercity/interfirm interactions (i.e. stronger
connections are more important, as they connect cities of sheer economic size), which has
been employed in most previous analyses. We adopt this conventional projection method
to ensure a consistent comparison with previous findings. Nevertheless, we note that
alternative theoretically-driven projections, such as a ‘sorting process’ method during which
firms are sorted into cities (Neal 2013), are suitable for revealing other aspects of world city
formation. In addition, we do not employ other projection methods (Alderson & Beckfield
2004; Hennemann & Derudder 2013) that (1) are suitable to derive intercity relations but
not interfirm connectivity; (2) produce sparse intercity networks in the case of a rather
limited number of firms; and/or (3) restrain the number and types of offices to be included
in the analysis.
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We assess the network positions of individual cities and firms with three network centrality
measures: degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality. Following Alderson et al. (2010),
we illustrate the implications of these centrality measurements with pedagogic networks.
The two networks (Figure 4) represent connections between cities and firms if we treat the
nodes as cities and firms, respectively. The star network (Figure 4a) exhibits a hierarchical
scenario, in which a firm or city with the position of A clearly holds a more central position
than other nodes in the network. In contrast, the circle network (Figure 4b) represents a flat
network, with all nodes attaining the same structural positions.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Degree centrality measures individual nodes’ direct linkages to other nodes in the network.
For example, node A in the star network has an advantageous position as it has more access
to other nodes in the network. For the intercity network, this means that the city in position
A has more peers to connect with than the other three cities (B, C, D), that is, city A has a
larger pool of potential connections. Similarly, firms with more connections tend to have
greater possibilities for interaction, such as co-operation and information sharing. By
contrast, all nodes in the circle network have exactly the same number of linkages and are
therefore equally positioned in the network.
Closeness centrality measures individual nodes’ inverse distances to all other nodes. For the
intercity network, cities with larger closeness have more direct and indirect access to other
cities, whereas a larger closeness in the interfirm network reflects less intermediate
steps/time that a firm needs to access information/innovations generated by other firms. In
this regard, node A in the star network is advantaged and has a larger closeness score: its
sum of inverse distance to other nodes (1/1 + 1/1 +1/1 = 3) is greater than that of nodes B-D
(1/2 + 1/2 + 1/1 = 2). By contrast, all four nodes (A-D) in the circle network have equal
closeness scores (1/1+1/1+1/2 = 2.5).
Betweenness centrality captures nodes’ tendency for performing brokerage roles, i.e.
controlling or facilitating interactions between other nodes. In the star-like intercity
network, business connections between cities B-D (or B-C or C-D) cannot bypass city A,
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whereas city A requires no intermediate cities to conduct business with other cities. Hence
A has a betweenness of 3 for the entire network, whereas the betweenness centrality of B,
C, and D equals 0. Similarly, firms in positions A can control the exchange of information and
innovation between other pairs of firms, achieving a certain degree of monopoly on
information spillovers. In comparison, nodes A-D in the circle network are equally
advantaged/disadvantaged in controlling flows between other pairs of nodes: all nodes have
a betweenness centrality of 1.
RESULTS
Thus far, we have described (1) the two-mode network underlying Taylor’s IWCNM and the
potential offered by exploring both modes of the intercity corporate network, (2) the
transformation of the data to arrive at consistent sets of intercity and interfirm networks for
2000 and 2010, and (3) the key tenets of three commonly used centrality measures in
network analysis. Combined, this gives us the opportunity to assess the following questions,
which will be used to organise the discussion of our results:
 How have intercity and interfirm networks changed over time?
 Have intercity and interfirm networks become more or less hierarchical?
 What are the regional and sectoral tendencies in the evolution of intercity and
interfirm networks?
How have intercity and interfirm networks changed?
Before entering the discussion of changes in the intercity corporate network between 2000-
2010, it is helpful to take a small detour and examine the robustness of our analysis by
assessing whether city and firm rankings are consistent with previous studies (Table 1 and
2)4. On the one hand, cities’ ranks for 2000 and 2010 are largely in line with those identified
based on the fuller GaWC datasets (Taylor et al. 2002, 2014; Derudder et al. 2010) and/or
4 For ease of interpretation, all centrality scores are normalised. An overview of normalisation of centrality
scores in one- and two-mode networks can be found in Borgatti & Everett (1997).
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different intercity networks (Smith & Timberlake 2001; Alderson & Beckfield 2010). For
example, our analysis confirms that major cities in the emerging economies (e.g. Dubai and
Mumbai) rise into the top of the global urban hierarchy, whereas a number of established
first tier cities (e.g., New York, London, Hong Kong, and Paris) maintain their leading
positions (Table 1). On the other hand, the rankings of firms reported here are also
consistent with previous findings (Neal 2008), with banks and accounting firms assuming
leading positions in the interfirm network (Table 2). Therefore, despite using a subset of the
GaWC dataset, our analysis of both modes in the intercity corporate network appears to
generate intercity and interfirm networks that largely coincide with previous studies.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
While there seems to be little variation among the top cities in the three centrality rankings
for individual years, the inequalities within individual rankings vary, suggesting ‘a hierarchy
of hierarchies’ (Neal 2008). Note that the use of ‘hierarchy’ in the context of global
urban/firm networks is different from that in network science: the former focuses on the
uneven distribution of centralities among nodes, while the latter is more related to
directions of network linkages. The Gini coefficients5 of closeness centrality are smallest
(Table 4), reflecting that cities/firms can reach other with a few intermediate steps. Degree
centralities for both cities and firms are more hierarchical, as there are nonetheless sizable
differences in the level of integration in the networks. The unevenness within betweenness
centrality is the most extreme, because there are only a few cities and firms that are
privileged with brokerage roles in the intercity and interfirm networks (Neal 2008).
Our results suggest that the global firm network has undergone extensive change, as the
correlations between centrality scores in 2000 and 2010 are moderate at best (Table 3; see
also QAP correlations in the appendix). In comparison, the global urban hierarchy is more
5 Larger Gini coefficients represent greater inequality among centrality scores. A Gini coefficient of 0 indicates
total equality, whereas a value of 1 suggests extreme inequality. Gini coefficient is often used to measure
income inequality, and we adopt it here to measure the unequal distribution of centralities among cities/firms.
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stable in terms of correlation between centrality scores in different years. With limited
supplementary data, the task of identifying the determinants of observed changes goes
beyond the scope of the current paper. However, a few conjectures can be made: these
changes may reflect recent upheavals in the global geo-economic structure, or they may
reflect long-term organisational changes of producer services firms (e.g. mergers,
acquisitions, joint ventures, and other forms of strategic alliances).
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The most notable feature in this transition is the overall integration in intercity and interfirm
networks during the period 2000-2010, as evidenced by a number of related indicators: the
average degree centralities for cities and firms increase substantially between 2000 and
2010. With the 10 per cent threshold, the interfirm network is close to fully connected in
2010 (Table 3). Individual cities are able to establish more direct economic connections with
other cities, whereas firms are able to benefit from interacting directly with a larger number
of firms. This enhanced integration shrinks distances among cities and firms, so that
closeness centrality increases for both cities and firms. Furthermore, average betweenness
centralities decline for interfirm networks, as fewer firms occupy brokerage positions when
interfirm networks become more connected (Table 7). Similar observations can be made for
intercity networks: As former ‘peripheral’ regions are rapidly integrating into the global
urban network (at least those produced by APS firms), North American and European cities’
betweenness centralities relatively decline.
As noted earlier, the urban hierarchy is more stable and steeper than the firm hierarchy.
The correlations between centrality scores of cities during 2000-2010 are generally greater
than those of firms, that is, the shuffling of ranks is more volatile in the interfirm network
(Table 3). For example, 22 firms entered the top fifteen positions in centrality rankings
during 2000-2010. The most noticeable example of stability is the consistent dominance of
New York and London (NY-LON) in the intercity network (Neal 2008; Taylor et al. 2013a).
Despite the emergence of an increasingly connected intercity network, NY-LON consistently
ranks atop all centrality rankings (Table 1). NY-LON’s dominance is especially evident in the
ranking of betweenness centrality: New York and London are the only true brokerage nodes,
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coordinating a sizeable amount (around 10 per cent for 2010) of all intercity connections in
both years. By contrast, no firm exhibits a similar dominance in the interfirm network.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Have intercity and interfirm networks become more or less hierarchical?
There are, in principle, different conjectures about the global distribution of connectivity in
the new urban hierarchy. At one end of the spectrum, the intercity network can be
expected to become more hierarchical with command-and-control functions of the global
economy increasingly concentrating in a limited set of cities (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 2001).
At the other end, a lessening of hierarchical tendencies in the global urban arena has been
suggested, with cities in the Global South quickly integrating into the world city network as
office networks have extended into other regions (Derudder et al. 2010). Therefore, we
assess the temporal changes of inequality among cities’ connectivity by tracing Gini
coefficients of centrality rankings in different years.
The results in Table 4 point to mixed tendencies. On the one hand, the distributions of
degree and closeness centrality become more even during 2000-2010, suggesting that cities
become similar in terms of number of strong economic linkages as well as average distances
to others. On the other hand, the unevenness among betweenness centralities remains
rather constant, despite more cities integrating into the world city network and making
average betweenness centrality scores decline.
There are also different hypotheses about hierarchical and heterarchical processes in the
interfirm network. On the one hand, firms with more branches in 2000 tend to continue
their expansive strategies, achieving a higher level of integration into the interfirm network
and thus potentially amassing additional structural advantage (Liu et al. 2013a). For
example, acquisition and mergers among firms usually concentrate market power into
fewer players (Neal 2008). On the other hand, while globalised spatial strategies were just
for the ‘happy few’ at the dawn of this century (Wall et al. 2011), more firms are now
equipped/motivated to pursue a worldwide presence, narrowing the gaps between firms’
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connectivity and creating a flatter firm hierarchy. Further complications are brought about
by the recent global economic crisis, during which many financial services as well as other
advanced producer services have undergone substantial reorganisation.
Our analysis (Table 4) suggests that while the interfirm network is becoming more
integrated and even, the brokerage/control functions, as captured by betweenness
centrality, remain modestly unequal among firms. The decreasing inequality among degree
and closeness centralities is consistent with the overall rise of network connectivity.
Meanwhile, the decreasing but still sizeable Gini coefficients for betweenness centralities
suggest that the power to control information sharing and diffusion remains modestly
concentrated in the integrated interfirm network.
While both networks exhibit a mix of hierarchical and heterarchical processes, the inequality
in the intercity network tends to be greater than that in interfirm networks. This confirms
previous observations that a small set of strategic places retain crucial positions in the
provision of advanced producer service in contemporary globalisation (Neal 2008; Taylor et
al. 2014).
What are the regional and sectoral tendencies in the evolution of intercity and interfirm
networks, respectively?
Regional and sectoral tendencies in the evolution of intercity and interfirm networks are
assessed based on the average centralities of individual regions and sectors (Table 5).
Where regionality has been a persistent feature of intercity networks (Taylor et al. 2001,
2013a), centralities of different regions in intercity networks have also been found to be
converging (Alderson et al. 2010; Mahutga et al. 2010): the regional inequalities among
average centralities are becoming less steep, i.e. erstwhile ‘peripheral’ regions are catching
up in terms of their integration in APS networks. Cities in Middle East & North Africa
(MENA), South Asia, and Eurasia, for instance, are characterised by above-average growth in
centrality scores (Table 6). The claim about the rise of MENA is particularly robust, as more
cities from this region have been included in our sample than other regions experiencing
growth (e.g. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa). In addition, leading cities in MENA, such as
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Dubai, have risen considerably in city rankings (see Table 1). However, the unevenness for
the betweenness centrality is still the most pronounced one among the three centrality
measures (Table 5) – despite that overall betweenness centralities are decline, the
command-and-control functions of advanced producer servicing have largely concentrated
in the worlds’ three major urban arenas: North America, Europe, and Pacific Asia.
Law and consultancy firms appear to enjoy above-average growth in closeness and degree
centrality and relatively less decline in betweenness centrality (Table 7). Advertising and
accounting firms seem to endure slower expansion rates in the selected 154 cities. When
these changes of centralities in law and consultancy are jointly examined with the
geographic distribution of individual firms (Rossi & Taylor 2006; Taylor et al. 2013a), these
diverging growth trends in different sectors may represent distinct globalisation processes,
extensive and intensive (Taylor et al. 2013b). This dichotomisation builds upon a ‘core-
periphery’ perception of the world-system, which consists of a densely interconnected
‘core’ and many less-connected ‘peripheries’ (Alderson & Beckfield 2004). Extensive
globalisation is characterised by linkages between the core (e.g. NY-LON) and periphery (e.g.
the Global South), whereas intensive globalisation focuses more on the intensification of
linkages within the core. Accounting firms often contribute to extensive globalisation, as
they usually have very large office networks. In fact, the largest firms in our dataset (e.g.
KPMG, Pricewaterhouse, and Deloitte), in terms of number of branches, are mainly
accounting firms. Advertising and accounting firms under investigation have undergone
extensive expansion in the selected 154 cities6 at the beginning of our study period, thus
appearing to be expanding less aggressively during 2000-2010. On the contrary, the office
networks of management consultancy and law firms are often concentrated in the world’s
major urban arenas, and are thus more involved in intensive globalisations (Taylor et al.
2014).
6 In a relative sense, the selected 154 cities could be deemed as an enlarged ‘core’ of the global economy as
these cities are connected (have strong economic relationships) for both years.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we explored the temporal evolution of both cities and firms in a two-mode
intercity corporate network formed by 50 leading advanced producer service firms across
154 cities. Drawing upon one-mode network projection and three network centrality
measures, we assess how individual cities and firms evolve in intercity and interfirm
networks. Our dataset is derived from GaWC datasets collected in 2000 and 2010.
Our analysis suggests that the global urban and firm networks contained in GaWC data have
undergone extensive changes between 2000 and 2010. The most notable feature in this
transition is the overall rise of connectivity in intercity and interfirm networks. Although
both intercity and interfirm networks are shifting, the urban hierarchy is more stable and
steeper than the firm hierarchy. Both intercity and interfirm networks are becoming more
connected, but the brokerage/controlling functions in the intercity networks have remained
rather centralised, reflecting a mixture of hierarchical and heterarchical processes. We also
explored cities and firms at aggregated scales, such as regions and sectors. For the intercity
network, regional inequalities among average centralities are decreasing. For the interfirm
network, sectoral dynamics are different, with law and consultancy firms achieving above-
average growth in centralities.
We explored both modes (i.e. cities and firms) in the intercity corporate network separately.
Scope for future extension of this line of research lies in (1) comparing one-mode networks
constructed by different projection methods (Neal 2014); (2) exploring centralities of cities
and firms simultaneously, with future advancement in direct two-mode network analysis
(Borgatti & Everett 1997); (3) employing advanced network visualisations (Vinciguerra et al.,
2010; Liu et al. 2013b); and (4) network normalisation should be employed in future
analysis, as direct comparisons of network metrics calculated for networks of different sizes
(e.g. the comparison between intercity and interfirm networks) may produce spurious
results (van Wijk et al. 2010). In addition, given our focus on methodological refinements to
Taylor’s (2001) IWCNM, our interpretations of the results have been restricted to
conjecture: more substantive understandings, fuelled by qualitative research are therefore
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needed to realise the potential of such a refined methodological approach (Parnreiter 2014;
Watson & Beaverstock 2014).
20
Appendix 1. QAP correlation between the original network and the network after applying a threshold (as a proportion of the strongest dyad)
Firm 2000 Firm 2010
City 2000 City 2010
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To circumvent the problem of fully connected projected networks, we impose a dichotomisation threshold at 10 per cent of the strongest dyad in original
networks. The resulting network has a much lower density, but nonetheless a sizable QAP correlation (with correlation coefficients > 0.9 in most cases;
QAP, Quadratic Assignment Procedure, see Hanneman & Riddle 2005) with the original network: this implies that the structure of dichotomised network
closely mimics the structure of the original network, but with a density that only the meaningful or ‘strong’ links are retained. Other thresholds such as 5
per cent, 15 per cent and 20 per cent have also been tested, and overall trends in the analysis remain, despite that specific orderings of hierarchies may
shift with different thresholds.
The number of linkages in thresholded networks are as follows: 2393 (intercity 2000), 5446 (intercity 2010), 800 (interfirm 2000), and 1090 (interfirm
2010). The QAP correlation between intercity networks in 2000 and 2010 is 0.5386, and the QAP correlation between interfirm networks in 2000 and
2010 is 0.3423. Both correlations are significant at the 0.01 level.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Centrality rankings of cities
Degree Closeness Betweenness
Rank City Score City Score City Score
2000
1 New York 1.0000 New York 0.9563 New York 0.3098
2 London 0.9932 London 0.9503 London 0.2973
3 Paris 0.6712 Paris 0.7356 Paris 0.0285
4 Amsterdam 0.6575 Amsterdam 0.7286 Hong Kong 0.0250
5 Hong Kong 0.6507 Hong Kong 0.7251 Toronto 0.0246
6 Toronto 0.6233 Toronto 0.7116 Amsterdam 0.0226
7 Tokyo 0.5959 Tokyo 0.6986 Tokyo 0.0117
8 Milan 0.5822 Milan 0.6923 Milan 0.0101
9 Madrid 0.5685 Madrid 0.6861 Chicago 0.0098
10 Singapore 0.5685 Singapore 0.6861 Madrid 0.0078
11 Los Angeles 0.5548 Los Angeles 0.6800 Los Angeles 0.0072
12 Chicago 0.5479 Chicago 0.6770 Singapore 0.0072
13 Sydney 0.5411 Sydney 0.6740 Brussels 0.0055
14 Brussels 0.5342 Brussels 0.6711 Frankfurt 0.0050
15 Sao Paulo 0.5342 Sao Paulo 0.6711 Sydney 0.0049
2010
1 London 1.0000 London 1.0000 London 0.1014
2 New York 0.9869 New York 0.9871 New York 0.0753
3 Hong Kong 0.9281 Hong Kong 0.9329 Hong Kong 0.0282
4 Paris 0.9150 Paris 0.9217 Paris 0.0233
5 Singapore 0.9085 Singapore 0.9162 Dubai 0.0211
6 Dubai 0.9085 Dubai 0.9162 Chicago 0.0196
7 Chicago 0.9020 Chicago 0.9107 Singapore 0.0183
8 Sydney 0.9020 Sydney 0.9107 Sydney 0.0178
9 Amsterdam 0.8889 Amsterdam 0.9000 Milan 0.0162
10 Mumbai 0.8889 Mumbai 0.9000 Amsterdam 0.0150
11 Tokyo 0.8824 Tokyo 0.8947 Mumbai 0.0149
12 Milan 0.8824 Milan 0.8947 Tokyo 0.0129
13 Kuala
Lumpur 0.8627
Kuala
Lumpur 0.8793
Kuala
Lumpur 0.0115
14 Toronto 0.8562 Toronto 0.8743 Toronto 0.0099
15 Sao Paulo 0.8562 Sao Paulo 0.8743 Sao Paulo 0.0099
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Table 2. Centrality rankings of firms
Degree Closeness Betweenness
Rank Firms Score Firms Score Firms Score
2000
1 KPMG 1.0000 KPMG 0.9608 KPMG 0.0561
2 PwC 0.9787 PwC 0.9423 PwC 0.0558
3 Deutsche Bank 0.9362 Deutsche Bank 0.9074 Mitsubishi UFJ 0.0442
4 Mizuho 0.9362 Mizuho 0.9074 Deutsche Bank 0.0246
5 McCann Erickson 0.9362 McCann Erickson 0.9074 Mizuho 0.0246
6 RSM 0.9362 RSM 0.9074 McKinsey 0.0245
7 Barclays 0.9149 Barclays 0.8909 McCann Erickson 0.0218
8 AGN 0.9149 AGN 0.8909 RSM 0.0218
9 Crowe Horwath 0.9149 Crowe Horwath 0.8909 Barclays 0.0149
10 HLB 0.9149 HLB 0.8909 HSBC 0.0132
11 JWT 0.9149 JWT 0.8909 AGN 0.0099
12 McKinsey 0.8936 McKinsey 0.8750 Crowe Horwath 0.0099
13 BBDO 0.8936 BBDO 0.8750 HLB 0.0099
14 PKF 0.8936 PKF 0.8750 JWT 0.0099
15 BNP Paribas 0.8936 BNP Paribas 0.8750 BBDO 0.0082
2010
1 KPMG 1.0000 KPMG 1.0000 KPMG 0.0065
2 McCann Erickson 1.0000 McCann Erickson 1.0000 McCann Erickson 0.0065
3 HSBC 1.0000 HSBC 1.0000 HSBC 0.0065
4 BDO 1.0000 BDO 1.0000 BDO 0.0065
5 Deloitte 1.0000 Deloitte 1.0000 Deloitte 0.0065
6 IBM 1.0000 IBM 1.0000 IBM 0.0065
7 Baker Tilly 1.0000 Baker Tilly 1.0000 Baker Tilly 0.0065
8 PwC 0.9796 PwC 0.9800 Mitsubishi UFJ 0.0056
9 Mitsubishi UFJ 0.9796 Mitsubishi UFJ 0.9800 Mizuho 0.0056
10 Deutsche Bank 0.9796 Deutsche Bank 0.9800 PwC 0.0026
11 RSM 0.9796 RSM 0.9800 Deutsche Bank 0.0026
12 AGN 0.9796 AGN 0.9800 RSM 0.0026
13 HLB 0.9796 HLB 0.9800 AGN 0.0026
14 PKF 0.9796 PKF 0.9800 HLB 0.0026
15 Moore Stephens 0.9796 Moore Stephens 0.9800 PKF 0.0026
Note: PwC = PricewaterhouseCoopers
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Table 3. Change of average centrality scores
Cities 2000 2010 COR(2000/2010)
Degree 0.2129 0.4623 0.8601
Closeness 0.5600 0.6737 0.8455
Between 0.0053 0.0035 0.9133
Firm 2000 2010 COR(2000/2010)
Degree 0.6528 0.8898 0.5907
Closeness 0.7509 0.9141 0.5712
Between 0.0080 0.0023 0.4008
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Table 4. Temporal evolution of hierarchies among cities and firms
Cities Degree Close Between
2000 56.09 11.17 95.97
2010 35.3 10.87 85.44
Firms Degree Close Between
2000 23.64 10.28 73.2
2010 7.79 5.45 49.31
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Table 5. Temporal evolution of hierarchies among regions and sectors
Regions Degree Close Between
2000 23.85 4.72 70.99
2010 13.98 4.18 37.67
Sectors Degree Close Between
2000 12.63 5.43 43.66
2010 5.64 3.95 30.58
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Table 6. Growth rates (%) for regions
Growth rate 2000-
2010 Degree Close Between
7
AUSTRALIA 99.18 17.72 224.71
EURASIA 248.10 30.20 1270.42
EUROPE 106.94 21.26 -46.28
LATIN AMERICA 96.52 12.68 195.27
MENA 234.57 20.73 2841.67
NORTH AMERICA 105.73 21.14 -61.57
PACIFIC ASIA 88.89 26.81 100.95
SOUTH ASIA 215.59 22.39 1343.40
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 214.80 12.67 65.36
WORLD 117.17 20.29 -32.92
7 Note: Regions with growth rate labelled as NA have zero betweenness centrality in 2000.
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Table 7 Growth rates (%) for sectors
Growth rate 2000-
2010 Degree Close Between
ACCOUNTING 24.49 19.65 -72.70
ADVERTISING 25.26 15.18 -70.88
BANKING 18.72 14.37 -81.97
CONSULTANCY 96.52 29.97 -59.86
LAW 59.65 32.58 -20.80
ALL SECTORS 36.31 21.73 -71.28
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Figure 1. (a) Pedagogical city-by-firm matrix.
City/Firm
Ernst &
Young BBDO HSBC Jones Day Boston
Beijing 0 2 2 0 0
London 3 4 5 2 2
New York 5 5 4 4 2
Paris 2 3 4 2 2
Tokyo 2 2 3 2 2
White and grey circles represent cities and firms, respectively. Link width is
proportional to the number (total value) of linkages, and the nodal size is
proportional to cities’ total out degree and in degree.
36
Figure 2. Inferred interlocking city network (diagonal elements are set to zero) and its
graphical representation.
Beijing London New York Paris Tokyo GCC
Beijing 0 18 18 14 10 60
London 18 0 67 46 37 168
New York 18 67 0 53 44 182
Paris 14 46 53 0 30 143
Tokyo 10 37 44 30 0 121
GCC 60 168 182 143 121
GCC = Global City Connectivity (Equivalent to Global Network Connectivity (GNC) in Taylor 2001),
the total number of linkages of individual cities.
Link width is proportional to the number of linkages, and the nodal size is proportional to
cities’ GCC.
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Figure 3. Inferred interlocking firm network (diagonal elements are set to zero) and its
graphical representation.
Ernst & Young BBDO HSBC Jones Day Boston GFC
Ernst & Young 0 47 49 34 24 154
BBDO 47 0 62 38 28 175
HSBC 49 62 0 40 32 183
Jones Day 34 38 40 0 20 132
Boston 24 28 32 20 0 104
GFC 154 175 183 132 104
GFC = Global Firm Connectivity, the total number of linkages of individual firms.
Link width is proportional to the number of linkages, and the nodal size is proportional to
firms’ GFC.
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Figure 4. Star-like and circle networks
a. Star-like network
b. Circle network
